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Abstract
Purpose:  To assess  the  impact  of  the  mandatory  adoption  of  the  International  Financial
Reporting  Standards  (IFRS)  on  the  quality  of  the  financial  information  available  on  listed
companies in the UK and France.
Design/methodology: This  research  uses  panel  regressions  to  analyze  the  relationship
between the idiosyncratic risk of  stock returns and the opacity of  financial reports, before and
after  the  mandatory  adoption  of  IFRS.  Opacity  calculations  include  different  proxies  of
earnings management,  according to the models  used in the literature for the  estimation of
discretionary accruals, as a robustness test.
Findings: Firm size influences the impact of  IFRS in the UK, and the financial information of
larger firms seems to have improved after IFRS adoption. In the case of  France, the results do
not support any improvement in the quality of  the financial information after IFRS were put in
place.
Research limitations/implications: This research applies a new methodological approach to
study the impact of  IFRS adoption, but additional inquires on the subject are surely required.
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Practical  implications: Certain features of  the countries,  such as the Common Law legal
system and enforcement, could explain why the quality of  the financial information for large
firms has increased following the adoption of  IFRS. It seems that the implementation of  IFRS
has given investors additional elements with which to ascertain a firm’s ability to generate future
cash flows.
Social implications: The adoption of  IFRS, by itself, is not enough to improve the quality of
financial information. Thus, regulators in countries adopting IFRS should consider additional
reforms to ensure that the desired results are achieved.
Originality/value: This  work overcomes the  methodological  design  problems of  previous
research,  such as  sample  selection  bias,  the  inclusion of  observations  close  to  the  year  of
mandatory adoption, the heterogeneity of  each country and the size of  the analyzed companies.
To the best of  our knowledge, this research is the first to test the effect of  IFRS adoption in
the European context, using the relation between idiosyncratic risk and the opacity of  financial
reports.
Keywords: Financial information quality, Earnings management, IFRS adoption
Jel Codes: M4, M48
1. Introduction
In 2002 the European Union (EU) approved the IAS Regulation, that requires listed companies to
adopt,  on  a  mandatory  basis,  the  International  Financial  Reporting  Standards  (IFRS)  for  the
preparation of  their consolidated financial statements for the fiscal years starting as of  January 1, 2005
(Aisbitt, 2006; Brüggemann, Hitz & Sellhorn, 2013; Daske, Hail, Leuz & Verdi, 2008; Soderstrom &
Sun,  2007).  Its  purpose  is  to  ensure  a  high  level  of  transparency  and  comparability  of  financial
information,  thus  attempting  to  obtain  an  efficient  operation  of  the  capital  markets  in  the  EU
(Brüggemann et al., 2013). Some authors believe that the route selected by the EU, adopting a common
language for financial reporting, is one of  the most important regulatory changes made in this field
during the last thirty years, if  not throughout all of  history (Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2008; Daske et al.,
2008; Doukakis, 2014).
-851-
Intangible Capital – https://doi.org/10.3926/ic.939
About this process, Brüggemann et al. (2013) indicate that research on the potential impact of  the
adoption of  the IFRS in the EU is still in its early stages and requires closer scrutiny in order to assess
its costs and benefits. Likewise, these authors stress that there are two types of  consequences for the
EU economy derived from this regulation: the expected and unexpected effects. With reference to the
expected effects, other studies have focused on the impact that the IFRS have had (not only in Europe,
but  also  in  other  parts  of  the  world)  on  the  quality  of  financial  information,  using  “earnings
management” (EM) as a proxy in this regard (Barth, Landsman & Lang, 2008; Callao & Jarne, 2010;
Cang, Chu & Lin, 2014; Doukakis, 2014; Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2008; Pelucio-Grecco, Geron, Grecco &
Lima, 2014; Soderstrom & Sun, 2007; Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2005; Zéghal, Chtourou & Sellami,
2011).  The concept  of  EM,  or  earnings  management,  assumes  that  there  is  a  certain  amount  of
discretion on the part of  management when it comes to preparing financial information, which enables
them to alter the perception that external users of  the financial reports, investors or creditors, have
about a company’s results (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). A priori, for this research it is not clear whether the
IFRS can boost or hamper EM, given that the effects generated against earnings management by high-
quality financial reporting standards, such as the IFRS, can be undermined by the use of  fair value and
greater flexibility that are permitted by these standards (based on principles) (Aisbitt, 2006; Callao &
Jarne,  2010;  Cang et al.,  2014;  Doukakis,  2014;  Soderstrom & Sun, 2007).  In this regard, different
empirical studies on the topic offer different conclusions, and therefore there is no unanimity as to
whether the IFRS have a positive or negative impact on EM, and consequently on the quality and
transparency  of  financial  information.  In  this  regard,  as  Brüggemann  et  al.  (2013)  explain,  the
contradictory results in this literature can be conditioned by factors that emanate from the research
methodology design.
This work adds to  the discussion of  the impact of  the IFRS on the quality of  financial information
from a different perspective. The relationship between EM and shareholder returns has already been
studied in the American context (Baber, Chen & Kang, 2006; Beyer, 2009; Das, Kim & Patro, 2011;
Hutton et al., 2009; Kang, Liu & Qi, 2010; Konan, Chan, Jegadeesh & Lakonishok, 2006; Li, Francis &
Hasan, 2011). However, this has not been the case for European countries, in particular for the study
of  the  impact  the  mandatory  adoption  of  these  standards  has  on  the  quality  of  the  companies’
financial  information  (measured  as  EM).  This  study  thus  uses  the  methodology  implemented  by
Hutton et al. (2009) to study the effect the adoption of  IFRS has on the relationship between EM and
shareholder returns. Making use of  the measures of  opacity and idiosyncratic risk proposed by Hutton
et al. (2009), here we study the effect of  the mandatory adoption of  the IFRS on the idiosyncratic risk
of  companies in the United Kingdom and France. The choice of  these countries is justified by the fact
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that they did not allow the voluntary adoption of  the IFRS prior to 2005, since as established by other
research (Barth et al., 2008; Doukakis, 2014; Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2008), studies on the adoption of
IFRS can include a selection bias by studying countries that permitted the voluntary adoption of  these
standards. Furthermore, the United Kingdom and France exhibit large differences in terms of  their
legal  systems  and the  rigor  with  which  they  apply  accounting  standards,  factors  which  have  been
identified as far-reaching when it comes to evaluating the effect the adoption of  IFRS can have on the
quality  of  the financial  information (Brüggemann et  al.,  2013;  Daske et al.,  2008;  Doukakis,  2014;
Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2008; Liao, Sellhorn & Skaife, 2012; Soderstrom & Sun, 2007; Von Koch, Nilsson,
Jonsson & Jansson, 2014).
The results of  this work indicate that it is only when the size of  the companies is taken into account
that it becomes possible to appreciate the fact that the IFRS have a positive impact on the quality of
financial information, by reducing the negative correlation between opacity and the idiosyncratic risk of
the shareholder returns of  the largest companies. Of  course, this is consistent with the heterogeneity
characteristic of  each country and thus it  is  only possible to observe that behavior for the United
Kingdom, which unlike France, has a Common Law legal system and demands great rigor in terms of
compliance with accounting rules. Finally, there is a series of  events that we believe deserve closer
scrutiny, which could be addressed in future studies. In this sense, it is interesting to note that judging
from the tests conducted, it could be inferred that IFRS reduce the idiosyncratic risk of  the shareholder
returns for companies in these countries. In contrast to this and the conclusions reached in this study, it
must be stressed that this is a pioneering approach to the evaluation of  the effects of  the mandatory
adoption of  IFRS,  from the perspective  of  the  analysis  of  the  relationship  between EM and the
companies’ idiosyncratic risk, and does not intend to reach any conclusive results on this topic; rather, it
seeks to provide support for other methods that might help measure the effects of  the IFRS on the
quality  of  financial  information  in  the  EU  in  the  future,  taking  into  account  the  improvement
opportunities for the empirical approaches implemented so far.
The following section reviews the literature and proposes the hypotheses that guide this work. Next,
the  research design is  discussed in the  3 section.  The 4 and 5 sections present the results  of  the
regression analyses, while the 6 and 7 sections discuss and draw conclusions about the results of  this
study. Finally, sections 8 and 9 contain the appendixes and the bibliography, respectively.
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2. Review of  the literature and proposal of  the hypotheses
Research on the adoption of  IFRS and the effect they can have on the quality of  financial information
varies, insofar as: 
• it  is  not  limited  to  the  European  context,  rather  it  discusses  their  impact  on  emerging
economies, such as China and Brazil; and
• there are differing views on the effect these standards have on the quality of  financial reporting.
Likewise, it is worthwhile to stress that one of  the most common measures used to assess the quality
of  financial information is EM, which is negatively associated with the quality of  financial information
(Barth et al., 2008; Soderstrom & Sun, 2007; Von Koch et al., 2014).
Accordingly, Barth et al. (2008) conducted a study on 21 developed and emerging countries (which
included  Switzerland,  China  and  Germany,  among  others),  their  findings  indicate  that  the
implementation of  IFRS is negatively associated with EM. Along these same lines, Zéghal et al. (2011)
found that in the case of  France, for those companies with good levels of  corporate governance that
depend on foreign financial markets, the adoption of  IFRS is negatively related to EM. In the case of
Brazil, Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014) show that the implementation of  full IFRS plays a restrictive role
on EM in listed companies. On the contrary, Callao and Jarne (2010) and Cang et al. (2014) indicate
that, for the EU and China, the adoption of  these standards is positively associated with EM. Both
studies agree in stating that IFRS make financial information more flexible and subjective, through the
criteria for the valuation and recognition of  the elements of  the financial statements, among which the
use of  reasonable value stands out. On the other hand, Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) conducted a study
on Australia, France and the United Kingdom in which they found that EM remains stable in Australia
and the United Kingdom, and only increases in France once the IFRS are adopted. Similarly, Doukakis
(2014) found that for 22 European countries between 2000 and 2010, the mandatory adoption of  IFRS
had no significant impact on earnings management based on accruals and real activities. In addition,
Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) determined that in Germany, the perceived EM for companies
that adopted IFRS showed no different behavior as compared to those that reported their financial
statements according to German accounting principles.
It  is  evident  that  empirical  studies  considering  the  impact  of  IFRS  on  the  quality  of  financial
information fail to draw any single conclusion. This may be due to aspects related to the design of  the
research  methodology  that  is  used  by  the  authors.  Brüggemann  et  al.  (2013)  confirmed  this  by
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indicating that certain problems in the design of  the studies are responsible for the mismatch between
the empirical evidence against the increase in the comparability and the transparency of  information,
product of  the mandatory adoption of  the IFRS in the EU, and the benefits at a macroeconomic level
and in the capital markets validated in this group of  countries after 2005.In this context, authors such
as Barth et al. (2008), Doukakis (2014) and Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) argue that there is a selection
bias problem for those studies that compare the quality of  the companies’ financial information before
and after the adoption of  the IFRS, because they do not distinguish between the countries that allowed
the voluntary adoption of  these standards before 2005 and those that did not. This problem lies in the
fact that the companies that receive benefits or product advantages from the implementation of  IFRS
will have an incentive to do so before the established deadline, which can exacerbate the effects of
these  standards  on  the  quality  of  the  financial  statements  (Jeanjean  & Stolowy,  2008).  Moreover,
uncertain effects on EM have also been identified in the years soon after the transition from local rules
to IFRS (Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2008), which is in line with other studies that have been conducted on the
adoption of  IFRS that  indicate  the noticeable effect  the figures of  the income statement and the
balance sheet can have (Aisbitt,  2006;  Capkun & Cazavan-Jeny,  2008; Cormier, Demaria,  Lapointe-
Antunes & Teller, 2009; Haller, Ernstberger & Froschhammer, 2009).
Taking this into account, this research contributes to the discussion on the impact that IFRS have on
the quality of  financial information in the EU, from a perspective that has not been considered so far,
as indicated by the review of  the literature. In this regard, while it can be established that studies on the
mandatory adoption of  IFRS in the EU have concentrated on two lines, the first on the analysis of  the
stock market reactions, and the second on the discussion of  the effects on the financial statements
(Daske et al., 2008), it has not been assessed whether the mandatory adoption of  these standards has
any effect on the relationship between the quality of  the financial information (measured as EM) and
shareholder returns; it is in this aspect that this research contributes to the literature concerning the
discussion of  the mandatory adoption of  IFRS in the EU.
With regard to the relationship between EM and shareholder returns, works such as that by Kang et al.
(2010) indicate that the discretionary accruals have a predictive power on the market returns that is
larger  than  that  of  normal  accruals,  which  implies  that  when  only  the  relationship  between  total
accruals and shareholder returns is analyzed, this negates the discretion a company’s management has
when it comes to manipulating its financial information and impacting the price of  its shares on the
stock market.  Das et al.  (2011), in turn, found that the administrators of  companies traded on the
capital market use EM and expectation management as supplements or replacements, with the aim of
-855-
Intangible Capital – https://doi.org/10.3926/ic.939
generating net returns on the share prices of  the companies they manage. The work by Baber et al.
(2006) concluded that the early disclosure of  information on the financial status of  a company can help
the market assess whether the earnings announcements by a particular company are being altered by
EM. On the other hand, Konan et al. (2006) concluded that the accruals are negatively related to future
returns and that non-discretionary or normal accruals do not reveal any predictive power in terms of
these returns. Likewise, they conducted a study parallel to this one, which considered ordinary shares
from non-financial companies in the USA, on the United Kingdom, stressing that this was the first time
that an analysis of  this type had been carried out in for the latter country.
In addition to the above-mentioned studies, we should also mention that by Hutton et al. (2009). These
researchers proposed a measurement of  the opacity of  the financial information that makes use of  EM
and established that it has a negative relationship with the idiosyncratic risk of  the shares. This is due to
the fact that if  there is less specific information about the firm, product of  the EM, and the share price
returns  for that  company will  be  explained to a  greater  extent  by  the  systematic  risk  than by the
idiosyncratic risk.
2.1. Hypothesis 1
Based on the analysis by Hutton et al. (2009) and the empirical evidence found in the literature on IFRS
adoption, the first hypothesis of  this study is proposed: Prior to the adoption of  IFRS, there was a negative
relationship between the opacity and the idiosyncratic risk measurement; this relationship will remain the same (or differ),
depending on whether those factors inherent to the mandatory adoption of  the IFRS and that support the EM dominate
(or not) over those that restrict it. Thus, although it is to be expected that the IFRS favor an improvement in
the quality of  financial information, as they are high-quality standards (in relation to many generally
accepted accounting principles used locally in the EU), it is also true that they significantly rely on the
use of  professional judgment and private information from companies, which along with valuation
criteria  such  as  fair  value,  provide  greater  flexibility  to  management  when  it  comes  to  preparing
financial statements (Barth et al.,  2008; Callao & Jarne, 2010; Cang et al.,  2014; Daske et al.,  2008;
Doukakis, 2014; Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2008).
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2.2. Hypothesis 2
In addition to the above, various authors have also concluded that the impact of  the implementation of
IFRS depends on external factors that may be specific to each country (Brüggemann et al., 2013; Daske
et al., 2008; Doukakis, 2014; Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2008; Liao et al., 2012; Soderstrom & Sun, 2007; Von
Koch et al., 2014). Among the most important elements that affect the IFRS are laws and regulations
that have been passed prior to their implementation, the political and legal system, the rigor with which
the  accounting  standards  are  applied,  property  structures,  mechanisms  of  corporate  governance,
economic development, the importance of  the capital  markets  and similarity  between the generally
accepted accounting principles and the IFRS. Accordingly, the second hypothesis of  this study indicates
that it is expected that the relationship between the opacity and the idiosyncratic risk measurement after the mandatory
adoption of  the IFRS is conditioned by the heterogeneity characteristic of  each country.
2.3. Hypothesis 3
Several works in the literature on EM and the adoption of  the IFRS have indicated the role that might
be played by the size of  the companies. In this sense, earnings manipulation would in many cases be
tied  to  the  size  of  the  company,  as  the  larger  and more profitable  a  company is,  the  greater  the
incentives  are  by  the  authorities  to  scrutinize  its  financial  statements,  which  is  why  this  type  of
companies  tend  to  reduce  their  level  of  EM  (Beekes,  Pope  &  Young,  2004;  Van  Tendeloo  &
Vanstraelen, 2005;  Watts & Zimmerman, 1990).  Likewise, the literature on IFRS adoption has also
shown the differentiating role  played by company size  in the accounting policies  they adopt,  their
effects  on  assets  and  net  profits,  and  the  costs  and  benefits  received  upon  implementing  these
standards (Eierle & Haller, 2009; Goodwin & Ahmed, 2006; Nobes & Perramon, 2013). Therefore, it is
to be expected that the relationship between the opacity and idiosyncratic risk of  the shareholder returns would not be the
same for companies of  different sizes after the mandatory adoption of  IFRS in 2005.
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3. Research methodology
3.1. Sample
Taking into account the hypotheses proposed and the previous review of  the literature, this research
studies the effects on  opacity and  idiosyncratic risk for companies traded on the stock markets in the
United Kingdom and France. These two countries were selected based on the fact that they both have
highly  developed  stock markets  (Konan  et  al.,  2006;  Liao  et  al.,  2012),  different  legal  systems  (a
Common Law system in the case of  the United Kingdom and a Civil Code in France), and differences
in  the  rigor  with  which  the  accounting  standards  are  applied  (Clarkson,  Hanna,  Richardson  &
Thompson, 2011; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). In a similar manner, in order to
address the problem of  selection bias, it was not possible to voluntarily adopt the IFRS before 2005 in
either France or the United Kingdom (Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2008).
Once the countries to be analyzed were selected, the data available in Bloomberg were downloaded to
determine the closing prices, shares in circulation and information on the financial statements of  the
ordinary shares in the United Kingdom and France. For each country and based on the analysis by
Hutton et al.  (2009),  a series of  filters was applied to the sample, related to the measurements of
idiosyncratic  risk and opacity.  Accordingly,  first  of  all,  in  accordance with standard practice  in the
literature, those companies related to financial services and utilities were eliminated from the sample.
Later,  in  order  to  calculate  the  idiosyncratic  risk  of  the  companies’  shares,  those  observations
(company-year) that do not have enough information to calculate at least 26 weeks of  shareholder
returns per fiscal year were excluded from the sample. Likewise, for the case of  EM and opacity, those
firms  that  did  not  provide  enough  information  in  their  financial  statements  to  calculate  the
discretionary accruals (DA) were excluded. At this regard, DA correspond to the EM measurement
used by this study and which will be discussed in greater depth later.
In this manner, the samples corresponding to both countries initially included observations (company-
year) covering a period from 1991 to 2014, and totaling 10,269 for the United Kingdom and 5,915 in
the case of  France. However, it is important to note that by using the analysis by Hutton et al. (2009)
which  relies  on  accounting  and  market  information  to  corroborate  the  relationship  between
idiosyncratic risk and opacity before and after the adoption of  IFRS in 2005 for the United Kingdom
and France, it is necessary to further restrict the sample in order to deal with the effect of  outliers. As a
result, the observations are limited to those companies that have market book value ratios between 10
and 1 and return on equity (ROE) with an absolute value of  less  than 100%. However,  it  is  also
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essential to purge the sample of  any effects that the years following the adoption of  the IFRS in 2005
might have on the financial information, as indicated in the previous section. Hence, this study does
not take into account information from the financial statements corresponding to 2006. Therefore,
taking into account the fact that opacity requires at least three time lags in the discretionary accruals
(measured from the EM) for its calculation, the sample is limited to 3,677 observations for the United
Kingdom  (1995-2005;  2007-2014)  and  2,941  for  France  (1992-2005;  2007-2014).  The  descriptive
statistics for the sample can be found in Appendix B.
3.2. Econometric Model
The  idiosyncratic  risk  of  a  stock  (Hutton  et  al.,  2009)  is  estimated  through  the  coefficient  of
determination from a regression analysis of  the variation of  the weekly returns on the share price as
function of  the market and industry returns (the sectors of  the Global Industry Classification Standard
were used to identify the industries in each country.). Eq. 1 indicates the regression that enables us to
calculate the coefficient of  determination or r-squared used to estimate the idiosyncratic risk:
rc,t=βc+β1,crs,t+β2,crs,t-1+β3,crs,t+1+β4,crm,t+β5,crm,t-1+β6,crm,t+1+εc,t (1)
The market (rm) and industry (rs) returns are estimated by calculating the continuous weekly returns of  a
portfolio, weighted by the value for each case. According to this approach, the systematic risk of  a
company's  stock  returns  is  estimated  by  the  r-squared  of  Eq.  1.  Therefore,  the  r-squared  of  the
regression, which explains the continuous returns of  the stock (rc), is used to calculate the idiosyncratic
risk of  the stock, according to Eq. 2:
Idiosync .Risk= ln(1−R 2R 2 ) (2)
On the other hand, the opacity measurement, which is used as a proxy of  the quality of  the financial
information, uses the EM, which in turn is calculated based on the DA. Hutton et al. (2009) indicate
that their proxy of  opacity corresponds to a measure of  the transparency of  financial reporting, based
on the fact that EM is a measure of  transparency. In this study, it is assumed that the opacity variable
corresponds to a proxy of  the quality of  the financial information, due to is derived from a measure of
EM, since as indicated in the previous section, EM is considered in the literature on IFRS adoption as a
variable that has a negative correlation with the quality of  the information contained in the financial
statements. This work uses the  Modified Jones Model (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1995) to estimate the
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DA, as its predictive power to detect DA is greater than that of  other existing models, and it is more
commonly used in research employing DA as a proxy of  EM (Dechow, Hutton, Kim & Sloan, 2012;
Dechow et al., 1995; Doukakis, 2014). The Modified Jones Model indicates that it is necessary to estimate
the errors of  the following regression in order to calculate the DA:
TAt
Ass t−1
= 0
1
Ass t−1
+β 0
Sales t− AR t
Ass t−1
+β 1
PPE t
Ass t−1
+ε t (3)
In this case, the regressions are estimated by industry groups in each year, ensuring that there are at
least eight observations per sector in order to perform the regression (Doukakis, 2014). In this manner,
in  Eq.  3  the  total  accruals  of  a  company  (TAt)  are  regressed  according  to  the  variation  in  sales,
discounting the effect of  the variation on accounts receivable (ΔSalest  - ΔARt) and the variation of  the
property, plant and equipment account (ΔPPEt), all of  which is scaled by the first lag in total assets
(Asst-1). The figures for the estimated errors of  the previous regression are the measure of  DA used as a
proxy of  the EM of  a company. With this information, the opacity is calculated (Hutton et al., 2009) in
the following manner:
Opacity=AbsV.(DAt-1)+AbsV.(DAt-2)+AbsV.(DAt-3) (4)
The sum of  the absolute values (AbsV.) of  the discretionary accruals (DA) constitutes a better proxy
for the quality of  the financial information than the EM measured by the DA, since if  a firm has a
highly positive level of  DA in a certain period, it is to be expected that this will be reversed in the
following period, showing as a result highly negative DAs, which is penalized in the Eq. 4 by taking into
account the absolute value of  the DAs, which may not be considered by observing only the individual
DAs for each year.
The analysis of  the relationship between the idiosyncratic risk of  a company’s stock returns (IRit) and
the opacity of  its financial information (Opacityit) is performed by a regression in which the variation of
the idiosyncratic risk of  a company is explained according to the opacity of  its financial information
and a series of  control variables, among them: size (Sizeit), measured as the natural logarithm of  its
market  capitalization,  the  ratio  of  its  market  value  (or  market  capitalization)  and  its  book  value
(Market_book_val_ratioit), level of  indebtedness (Indebtednessit), level of  return on equity (ROEit), variation
(Sector_variationit),  level  of  asymmetry  (asymmetry  coefficient)  (Assymetryit)  and  kurtosis  (kurtosis
coefficient) (Kurtosisit) of  the distribution of  the stock returns from the portfolio of  the industry to
which the company belongs.
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In this way, the regression model that permits analyzing the effect of  the adoption on the quality of
financial information is the following:
IRit=β0+β1Opacityit +β2Sector_variationit+β3Sizeit+β4Market_book_val_ratioit+β5Indebtednessit+
       β6ROEit+β7Assymetryit+β8Kurtosisit+β9IFRSit+β10Opacity#IFRSit+eit
(5)
The definition of  these and other variables used in this study can be consulted in Appendix A. As
indicated in the previous section, a priori, it is expected that the relationship between opacity and the
idiosyncratic risk of  a company would be negative.
4. Results
The results of  the regressions of  the idiosyncratic risk are consolidated below according to opacity and
the control variables discussed in the previous section. Note that the potential effect of  company size
was taken into account in the correlation between the variables of  interest (opacity and idiosyncratic
risk),  in  such  a  way  that  a  regression  analysis  is  performed  for  large and  small companies.  Large
companies were considered to be those above the 75th percentile for the size variable, while  small
companies  were  those  below the 25th  percentile.  Likewise,  in  order  to  evaluate  the  effect  of  the
adoption of  IFRS on the relationship between opacity  and idiosyncratic  risk,  we  create  a  dummy
variable, IFRSit, that takes the value of  1 after the year 2005 and 0 otherwise.
Panel A of  Table 1 presents the results for the United Kingdom. Specifications 1 and 2 include all the
firms; while specification 1 does not consider the adoption of  the IFRS, 2 includes the dummy variable
associated with the adoption and its interaction with opacity. In no case are the coefficients associated
with opacity significant, although the positive sign of  the interaction indicates a positive effect on the
quality  of  the  financial  information  during  the  period  following  their  adoption.  The  structure  of
specifications 1 and 2 is replicated for the samples segmented by size (except for the size variable).
Specifications 3 and 4 consider small companies for which, contrary to expectations and in contrast
with the previous results, the association between opacity and the idiosyncratic risk of  its stock returns
is positive and significant. This effect is reduced to an important degree during the post-IFRS period:
while the coefficient is 0.86 for the pre-IFRS period, this drops to just 0.021 (0.86-0.839) in the post-
IFRS era, and moreover, this value is similar in magnitude to the overall result (0.022). Altogether, these
results can be considered positively with regard to the effect of  the adoption of  IFRS on idiosyncratic
risk, given that the spurious positive relationship, characteristic of  the pre-IFRS period (this coefficient
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is probably affected by the dummy IFRS adoption variable, which is negative and significant. This also
applies to specifications 4 and 6), is affected in the expected manner by the adoption of  the rules. In
spite of  this,  we must note that the r-squared value (≈0.04) of  the estimates corresponding to the
smaller companies is low, and therefore we must be careful when interpreting the marginal effect of  the
opacity on the idiosyncratic risk before and after the IFRS.
For the large companies, specification 5, which eliminates the effect of  the adoption of  the IFRS on the
correlation between opacity and the idiosyncratic  risk of  large companies in the United Kingdom,
produces  the  opposite  results  of  those  for  specification  3,  reporting  a  negative  correlation  (non-
significant) between opacity and the idiosyncratic risk for these companies, which corresponds to the
expected result in the approach to Hypothesis 1. The results in specification 6 are also aligned with
Hypothesis 1, given that the association between the idiosyncratic risk is negative in the pre-IFRS era,
as  well  as  with  Hypothesis  2,  as  the  relationship  is  noticeably  diminished  once  the  IFRS  are
implemented in the United Kingdom, increasing from -2.096 to 0.175 (-2.096 + 2.271). It is important
to point out that the variation in the idiosyncratic risk of  large companies in the United Kingdom is
explained to a large extent by the proposed model, and likewise, the adjusted r-squared of  specification
6 is larger (≈0.15) than that of  specification 5 (≈0.10), indicating that the structural change brought
about  by  the  implementation  of  the  IFRS  helps  explain  to  a  greater  extent  the  variation  in  the
idiosyncratic risk of  large companies in the United Kingdom.
Panel B, corresponding to the analysis of  French companies, is  consistent with Hypothesis 1, as it
reports a negative impact of  the opacity of  its financial information and the idiosyncratic risk of  its
shares for all specifications. In this regard, it is observed that the negative relationship is maintained and
even magnified in specifications 1 and 2, which can lead to think that the adoption of  IFRS exacerbates
that association. When the effect of  company size on this relationship is analyzed, we can confirm that
in  the  case  of  smaller  companies  (specifications  3  and  4),  the  relationship  between  opacity  and
idiosyncratic  risk is  negative,  and even through the post-IFRS effect  is  negative,  it  does not  reach
significant levels. Likewise, as in the case of  the United Kingdom, the model used shows a poor fit for
small companies. On the other hand, in spite of  the fact that the r-squared of  the regressions is higher
for the largest companies (specifications 5 and 6) than for the previously analyzed group of  companies,
it could not be validated that the adoption of  IFRS has any effect on the relationship between opacity
and the idiosyncratic risk of  the stock return, given that none of  the variables associated with opacity
are significant. However, unlike what is reported for the sample of  companies in the United Kingdom,
both opacity and its post-IFRS effect maintain the same signs in the different specifications, which
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suggests a negative effect on the quality of  the financial information resulting from the adoption of
IFRS.
In  addition,  it  can be seen that,  for both countries,  the IFRS variable  reflecting  the  effect  of  the
adoption of  IFRS on the variation in idiosyncratic  risk  not  explained by the approach offered by
Hutton et al. (2009) is significant and negative for all companies in general, and for large firms.
With regard to the control variables, it is interesting to note the significant negative impact of  the size
variable on the idiosyncratic risk, which is consistent with the findings of  Hutton et al. (2009) and Roll
(1988),  suggesting that with larger sizes,  it  is  more difficult  to incorporate the informational effect
specific to each firm from that offered by the sector and market.
5. Robustness tests and notes on R2
In addition to the analysis by Hutton et al. (2009) and in order to validate the findings of  the previous
section, a series of  robustness tests were carried out. These re-estimated the opacity through the use of
different models to calculate the DAs.
On an international level, different methodologies have been used to measure EM by means of  DA.
Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014) reviewed the publications in this context for a period between the years
2008 and 2012, confirming the widespread use of  the Jones Model (Jones, 1991), the Modified Jones
Model (Dechow et al., 1995), the Modified Jones Model described by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005)
and the Modified Jones Model described by Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998), with the models proposed
by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005) being the most commonly used, with 24 and 18
publications, respectively (see Table 1, page 48 of  the document by these authors). Likewise, Pelucio-
Grecco et al. (2014) also indicate the virtues of  the Kang and Sivaramakrishnan Model (1995) and its
use in EM studies in Brazil. We also found support for the use of  these models in the literature in
works such as that by Louis (2004), Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian
(2008), Zéghal et al. (2011), Zhang, Uchida and Bu (2013), Cang et al. (2014) and Doukakis (2014).
Of  the  models  mentioned  for  the  calculation  of  DAs,  it  should  be  clarified  that  they  are
transformations of  the Jones Model, including the Modified Jones Model used in the previous section.
Accordingly,  we will  proceed to explain  how each model  estimates  the  DAs,  based on the details
provided in section 3.In this  regard,  the  Jones Model,  as  compared to the Modified Jones  Model,
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estimates the DAs by assuming that sales revenue is not susceptible to manipulation by management,
hence it does not take into account the adjustment due to variation in accounts receivable (∆ARt) of
Eq. 3  (Dechow et  al.,  1995).  Teoh  et  al.  (1998),  in  turn,  use  the  Modified  Jones  Model  without
considering the variation in fixed assets (∆PPEt) of  Eq. 3, as they argue that long-term accruals are less
likely to be manipulated by management. With regard to the model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995),
Kothari et al. (2005) indicate that it is necessary to contemporaneously include as a control variable, i.e.,
without any bias what so ever, return on assets (ROA), as the Modified Jones Model assumes that there
is an increase in DAs when the firm is in a growth stage. At this point, we must highlight that the
variables specified in Eq. 3 were scaled by the first lag of  the total assets.
Furthermore,  based  on the  KS Model,  Kang  and Sivaramakrishnan (1995)  propose  a  method for
calculating DAs using the estimated error of  the following specification:
TAt
Ass t−1
= 0+ 1( AR t−1Sales t−1)( Sales tAss t−1)+ 2( Inv t−1+EPAt−1−AP t−1E xpt−1 ) E xptAss t−1
+ 3(Dep t−1GFAt−1 )(GFAtAss t−1 )+ε t
(6)
Where in addition to the variables that were considered for Eq. 3, these authors included the effect of
inventories (Inv), expenses paid in advance (EPA), accounts payable (AP), total expenses without the
effect of  depreciation and amortization (Exp),  depreciation and amortization (Dep)  and gross fixed
assets (GFA).
The results of  the regression analysis using the aforementioned models can be seen in Appendix C. In
the case of  the United Kingdom, the results validated in the previous section are maintained. In this
way, it is possible to observe that, in general, according to different measures of  opacity (calculated
according to different estimates of  DAs), there is no relationship between the opacity of  the financial
information and the idiosyncratic risk of  the shares of  companies traded on the stock market in the
United Kingdom. Similarly, once we proceed to apply the analysis proposed by Hutton et al. (2009),
taking into account the effect of  company size, the regression results indicate that for large companies
in the United Kingdom, the relationship between opacity and idiosyncratic risk is negative before the
adoption of  the IFRS,  and once these financial  reporting standards were adopted,  this  association
tended to diminish.
Thus the marginal effect of  opacity on idiosyncratic risk once the IFRS were implemented is 0.357,
0.639 and 0.552 for the specifications that use the models by Jones (1991), Kothari et al. (2005) and
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Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995). In this same vein, the marginal effect prior to the adoption of  the
IFRS for large companies is -2.294, -2.653 and -1.275. In this sense, only the model by Teoh et al.
(1998) shows a coefficient for the interaction between the opacity variable and the IFRS variable that is
positive,  but  not  significant.  In  addition,  the  coefficients  of  determination  for  the  specifications
proposed for small companies in the United Kingdom are very low, which is in agreement with the
findings in the previous section.
In the case of  France, the results of  the specifications enable us to establish that while in the previous
section, it was possible to conclude that once the IFRS are adopted, the negative relationship shown
between opacity and idiosyncratic risk becomes more important for all firms; this does not occur for
any of  the established models. Furthermore, and this time in agreement with the results revealed in
panel B of  Table 1, there is no statistically significant relationship between opacity and the idiosyncratic
risk  of  the  larger  firms;  at  the  same time,  the  fit  of  the  specifications  proposed  for  the  smaller
companies traded in France is very low. Once again, these results must therefore be interpreted with
caution.  At  this  point,  the  specifications  related  to smaller  companies  could  indicate  that  there  is
apparently a negative relationship between opacity and the idiosyncratic risk for this group prior to the
adoption of  IFRS in 2005.
Finally, it is important to note that the dependent variable in our analyses is directly associated with the
coefficient  of  determination  of  a  regression  on  stock  returns.  Different  authors  have  found  a
generalized  reduction of  these  r-squares  (R2)  in  the  USA over time  (Morck,  Yeung  & Yu,  2000;
Campbell,  Lettau,  Malkiel  &  Xu,  2001;  Jin  &  Myers,  2006).  Consequently,  the  idiosyncratic  risk,
according to  the  interpretation  in  this  work,  has  increased and it  could  be  considered  that  a  less
negative association of  opacity with this risk, coinciding with the adoption of  IFRS, could be falsely
attributed as a positive effect of  its entry into force.
Appendix D shows the evolution of  R2 for the samples considered in the regressions for this study.
The trend for R2 for both samples barely increases and appears to be cyclical; this minimizes any urge
to attribute an effect to the adoption of  IFRS, which simply reflects a generalized decrease in R2.
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6. Discussion of  the results
In essence, the results indicate that at first glance, prior to the implementation of  the IFRS, there is no
relationship between the quality of  financial information and the idiosyncratic risk of  the stock in
companies in the United Kingdom. This finding partially contradicts the first hypothesis proposed in
this  study,  in  that  while  there  is  no  association  between opacity  and idiosyncratic  risk  before  the
implementation of  IFRS, it is possible to note that this relationship remains after 2005; this could be
interpreted as a compensation of  the conditions that strengthen and restrict EM, which are involved in
the adoption of  these standards.
In spite of  this, when we consider that the relationship between the quality of  the financial information
and the idiosyncratic risk, and the effect of  the IFRS on said relationship, may be affected by the size
of  the  companies  that  are  being  studied  (as  proposed  in  Hypothesis  3),  the  conclusions  change.
Accordingly, in the United Kingdom it is possible to confirm that the correlation among the analyzed
variables is not the same for large companies as compared to smaller ones. Larger companies show a
negative relationship between the opacity of  their financial information and the idiosyncratic risk of
their stock returns before 2005, but this relationship tends to disappear following the implementation
of  the IFRS. This fact evidences that the arguments in favor of  the positive impact of  IFRS on the
quality of  financial information prevail over those that indicate that these standards promote EM; it
also reveals an argument in favor of  the objectives stipulated by the IAS Regulation with regard to
improving the quality of  the financial reports. Accordingly, following the implementation of  IFRS, we
can argue that in the United Kingdom, the information provided by the financial statements helps
provide investors with more criteria, as well as information provided by the financial sector or market
to which a large company belongs (systematic risk) when assessing its capacity to generate future cash
flows, which is reflected in the stock price and thus in its stock returns.
At this point, readers may note that the research concludes that it is possible to appreciate a positive
effect of  IFRS on the quality of  financial information for large companies in the United Kingdom,
since as was explained in sections 4 and 5, of  the different models used in the literature to calculate the
DAs, most demonstrate this relationship; in particular, mention should be made of  those by Dechow et
al. (1995), Kothari et al. (2005) and Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995).
That said, in the case of  France,  it  is  possible to observe that the results of  sections 4 and 5 for
companies  in  general  are  in  agreement  with  what  is  proposed  in  Hypothesis  1.  Prior  to  the
implementation of  IFRS, there was a negative relationship between the opacity of  financial reports and
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the idiosyncratic risk of  the stock returns of  companies in general,  but once these standards were
implemented, it is not possible to observe that they have had any influence on the relationship between
the quality of  financial information and the idiosyncratic risk of  a company’s stock returns.
At this point, the results were considered from the section 5 in which the other approaches to EM
measured as the estimated DA revealed that there is no impact on the marginal effect of  opacity on the
idiosyncratic risk once the IFRS were adopted. Likewise, readers must consider that this effect is weak
in specification 2 of  panel B, as very low significance is reached (p-value<0.10).
In light of  this, it could be argued that factors such as professional judgment, valuation criteria (such as
fair value), among other aspects that support EM, are compensated by the improvement in the quality
of  accounting standards.  This  being the case,  with regard to company size,  contrary  to what was
expected by Hypothesis  3,  the effect  of  IFRS on the relationship between the quality  of  financial
information and idiosyncratic risk does not change when company size is taken into account.
From these findings, it is possible to establish that the effect of  the IFRS on the relationship between
the  quality  of  financial  information  and  the  idiosyncratic  risk  of  the  companies’  stock  returns  is
different  in  the  countries  analyzed.  As  evidenced  by  the  results,  larger  companies  in  the  United
Kingdom experience a benefit from the implementation of  IFRS that their peers in France do not after
adopting these standards. This coincides with what was expected by Hypothesis 2 and with various
studies that make note of  the advantages when implementing IFRS in countries such as the United
Kingdom, with a Common Law system and strict rigor in the application of  accounting standards; just
the opposite occurs in countries like France, which have a Civil Code system and less rigor in the
application of  accounting norms (Daske et al., 2008; Doukakis, 2014; Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2008; Liao et
al., 2012; Soderstrom & Sun, 2007; Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2005; Von Koch et al., 2014).
On the other hand, in terms of  the analysis of  the smallest companies in both countries, while the
models used show a poor fit and thus the results are not conclusive, they do indicate an aspect that
could be addressed in future studies. In the case of  France, it would seem that the smallest companies
are the ones that show a negative association between the quality of  financial information and the
idiosyncratic risk, which could indicate that the results presented for the companies in general may be
influenced to a large extent by the behavior of  the smallest companies. This position, however, requires
a more exhaustive analysis, due to the low coefficient of  determination of  the specifications related to
this group of  companies (this can be verified to a large extent from specifications 3 and 4 of  Table 1
and the robustness tests).
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In the same vein, this work also considers that the significance and sign of  the dichotomous variable
IFRS in  the  panels  of  Table  1  (as  for  most  of  the  specifications  of  the  robustness  tests)  for  all
companies and the largest ones in the United Kingdom and France may be a finding to consider in
future research. This can be seen through the change in the intercept of  the regressions presented and
would indicate that while the IFRS have a positive impact on the quality of  information by diminishing
the EM, thus improving the quality of  financial information and its impact on the idiosyncratic risk, as
explained earlier, the adoption in 2005 of  these standards in the United Kingdom and France would be
associated with a clear reduction in the idiosyncratic risk of  the stock returns for companies in these
countries.
7. Conclusions
Following Hutton et al. (2009), we studied the effect of  the IFRS mandatory implementation in the
United Kingdom and France on the quality of  financial information and stock returns of  companies,
analyzing the relationship between opacity, a proxy for the quality of  the information presented in the
financial  reports,  and the idiosyncratic risk of  the firms’  stock returns in these two countries.  The
results  of  the  regressions  analysis  indicate  that  for  the  United  Kingdom  this  relationship  is  not
observable a priori regardless of  the adoption of  the IFRS, unless the companies’ size is factored into
the  regressions.  This  country,  which  has  a  Common  Law  legal  system  and  demands  rigorous
compliance with accounting  standards,  shows an increase  in  the  quality  of  financial  reports  (from
companies traded on the stock market) in association with the mandatory implementation of  the IFRS
(after 2005) for companies with higher market capitalization. This result extends the conclusions of
studies such as those conducted by Barth et al. (2008), Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) and Liao et al.
(2012),  who report  improvements  in  the  quality  of  financial  information in  the  United  Kingdom
following the implementation of  IFRS.
Furthermore,  this  work  found  evidence  that  suggests  the  existence  of  a  negative  effect  of  the
implementation of  IFRS on the idiosyncratic risk for both countries. We believe that this is worthy of
more in-depth investigation in future studies. Finally, while this work uses a more robust methodology
in order to overcome the design problems of  previous research projects, at no point was it intended to
reach a definitive conclusion with regard to the discussion of  the effects that the mandatory adoption
of  IFRS have had on the quality of  financial information in the EU. It simply seeks to contribute to
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this discussion, suggesting the use of  a new approach that would permit the detailed analysis of  the
possible existence of  these effects.
Panel A. United Kingdom
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Idiosyncratic risk
 
All
b/p
All
b/p
Small
b/p
Small
b/p
Big
b/p
Big
b/p
Opacity 0.009
[0.661]
-0.122
[0.520]
0.022
[0.243]
0.860**
[0.026]
-0.122
[0.752]
-2.096**
[0.033]
Sector Variation 1.983**
[0.011]
2.520***
[0.001]
6.130**
[0.027]
6.154**
[0.026]
29.706***
[0.000]
29.422***
[0.000]
Size -0.273***
[0.000]
-0.274***
[0.000]
Market to book ratio -0.001
[0.883]
0.002
[0.856]
-0.037**
[0.034]
-0.041**
[0.022]
-0.009
[0.647]
-0.008
[0.685]
Indebtedness -0.201**
[0.013]
-0.268***
[0.001]
-0.004
[0.978]
-0.003
[0.981]
-0.150
[0.488]
-0.208
[0.325]
ROE 0.131*
[0.095]
0.089
[0.250]
-0.048
[0.633]
-0.045
[0.658]
-0.693***
[0.009]
-0.585**
[0.025]
Asymmetry 0.047***
[0.001]
0.044***
[0.001]
0.062***
[0.001]
0.061***
[0.001]
0.063
[0.254]
0.017
[0.754]
Kurtosis 0.023***
[0.000]
0.022***
[0.000]
0.015***
[0.005]
0.015***
[0.006]
0.085***
[0.000]
0.075***
[0.000]
IFRS -0.292***
[0.000]
0.086
[0.271]
-0.608***
[0.000]
Opacity # IFRS 0.139
[0.464]
-0.839**
[0.030]
2.271**
[0.031]
Intercept 2.866***
[0.000]
3.066***
[0.000]
2.001***
[0.000]
1.914***
[0.000]
0.319**
[0.029]
0.759***
[0.000]
Obs. 3677 3677 800 800 993 993
R2 0.3495 0.3660 0.0368 0.0428 0.1015 0.1498
R2 adjusted 0.3481 0.3642 0.0283 0.0319 0.0951 0.1420
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Panel B. France
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Idiosyncratic risk
 
All
b/p
All
b/p
Small
b/p
Small
b/p
Big
b/p
Big
b/p
Opacity -0.024
[0.141]
-0.021
[0.220]
-0.014
[0.368]
-0.014
[0.398]
-0.506
[0.537]
-0.503
[0.630]
Sector Variation 58.556***
[0.000]
50.692***
[0.000]
27.003***
[0.000]
16.811**
[0.017]
128.440***
[0.000]
120.032***
[0.000]
Size -0.229***
[0.000]
-0.226***
[0.000]
Market to book ratio -0.018
[0.106]
-0.026**
[0.018]
0.004
[0.833]
-0.003
[0.866]
-0.064**
[0.033]
-0.081***
[0.007]
Indebtedness -0.100
[0.296]
-0.253***
[0.009]
0.033
[0.858]
-0.055
[0.766]
0.330
[0.251]
0.155
[0.589]
ROE 0.336***
[0.001]
0.288***
[0.003]
-0.098
[0.466]
-0.153
[0.256]
1.593***
[0.002]
1.775***
[0.000]
Assymetry 0.088***
[0.000]
0.084***
[0.000]
0.042
[0.232]
0.042
[0.239]
0.145*
[0.059]
0.126*
[0.098]
Kurtosis 0.019***
[0.002]
0.019***
[0.002]
0.012
[0.224]
0.013
[0.210]
0.029
[0.166]
0.023
[0.270]
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IFRS -0.278***
[0.000]
-0.240***
[0.001]
-0.291**
[0.011]
Opacity # IFRS -0.072
[0.228]
-0.041
[0.551]
-1.792
[0.294]
Intercept 2.136***
[0.000]
2.386***
[0.000]
1.476***
[0.000]
1.692***
[0.000]
-0.608***
[0.007]
-0.266
[0.272]
Obs. 2941 2941 739 739 588 588
R2 0.3147 0.3293 0.0332 0.0505 0.2582 0.2786
R2_adjusted 0.3128 0.3270 0.0239 0.0388 0.2492 0.2674
Panels A and B report the results for the regressions of  the idiosyncratic risk of  the stock returns
according to the opacity of  the financial statements and a series of  control variables for companies
traded on the stock exchanges in the United Kingdom and France. The control variables include the
variation  of  the  returns  in  the  sector  to  which  the  company  belongs,  the  size  of  the  company
(measured  as  the  logarithm  of  its  market  capitalization),  the  coefficient  between  its  market
capitalization and its book value, its level of  indebtedness, its return on equity (ROE), asymmetry
coefficient and the kurtosis of  its stock return. The size, the coefficient of  the market book value and
the indebtedness lag one tax period behind. The standard errors of  the regressions were estimated in a
robust manner. The p-values are shown in brackets.***, **, * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.5 and 0.10.
Table 1. Relationship between idiosyncratic risk and opacity
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Appendices
Appendix A. Definitions of  variables
Variable Definition
TAt
Total Accruals of  a company. Correspond to the difference between net profits (excluding the effects of  
the discontinuity of  operations, changes in accounting practices, natural disasters and minority interests) 
and the cash generated by operating activities (Hutton, Marcus & Tehranian, 2009).
∆Salest Year-on-year change in net sales revenue.
∆ARt Year-on-year change in accounts receivable.
∆PPEt Year-on-year change in property, plant and equipment (net).
Asst-1 First lag of  Total Assets.
ROAt Return over Assets.
DAt
Discretionary accruals of  a firm. They are estimated from the EM model. In the results section they are 
estimated based on the Modified Jones Model, Eq. 3, but this specification changes for the results of  
robustness tests, where other EM models are incorporated.
Opacity As the quality of  financial information that is estimated from the sum of  the absolute values of  each of  the three lags of  discretionary accruals of  a firm. See Ec.4 section in Methodology for more details.
Sector 
Variation Variance of  the annual returns of  the industry to which it belongs to a firm.
Size
Natural logarithm of  the stock market capitalization of  a company. Market capitalization is measured at 
the beginning of  the fiscal period and is computed as the product between the price and the number of  
shares outstanding for a firm, adjusting for the effect of  splits and share rights.
Market to book
ratio Ratio of  market capitalization to book value at the beginning of  a firm's fiscal period. 
Indebtednes Ratio of  total liabilities and assets at the beginning of  a company's fiscal period.
ROE Return over Equity.
Asymmetry Coefficient of  asymmetry of  the distribution of  returns of  a firm for a given fiscal period.
Kurtosis Curtosis of  the distribution of  a firm's returns for a given fiscal period.
IFRS Dichotomous variable that takes the value of  1 for periods after 2005 (mandatory adoption of  IFRS in the EU) and 0 otherwise.
Appendix B. Descriptive statistics
Panel A. United Kingdom
Period (1995-2005; 2007-2014)
Figures in millions of  GBP
Variable Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Market Cap.          3,677     2,094.24     8,324.92              0.48   121,232.90 
Equity (Book value)          3,677        920.42     4,188.25          (95.34)     78,719.67 
Liabilities (Total)          3,677     1,346.45     6,051.17              0.02   116,439.50 
Assets (Total)          3,677     2,266.95   10,080.34              0.28   188,966.40 
Net profit          3,677        146.09        766.06     (2,152.49)     16,277.20 
Cash from operating activities          3,677        233.99     1,091.12        (522.00)     19,897.25 
Revenues          3,677     2,165.30   11,030.67                 -     242,476.20 
Property, plant and equipment (Net)          3,677        820.20     4,662.95                 -       83,879.08 
Accounts receivable          3,677        220.08        973.63                 -       19,529.30 
ROA (%)          3,677            3.93            9.85          (96.77)            67.54 
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Panel B. France
Period (1992-2005; 2007-2014)
Figures in millions of  EUR
Variable Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Market Cap.          2,941     1,828.65     5,721.34              0.33      84,984.93 
Equity (Book value)          2,941        943.90     3,106.92            (5.09)      47,472.42 
Liabilities (Total)          2,941     1,863.64     5,615.96              0.09      69,134.09 
Assets (Total)          2,941     2,807.29     8,163.20              0.87      94,810.38 
Net profit          2,941        100.87        393.49     (8,084.29)        5,150.62 
Cash from operating activities          2,889        193.20        567.26        (758.49)        8,460.42 
Revenues          2,941     2,152.02     5,859.35                 -        68,425.67 
Property, plant and equipment (Net)          2,941        528.88     1,580.52                 -        15,355.77 
Accounts receivable          2,941        400.00     1,079.43                 -        14,560.58 
ROA (%)          2,941            3.76            7.95          (67.10)             92.27 
Appendix C. Results of  the robustness regressions
Panel A. United Kingdom
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Companies
 
All
b/p
All
b/p
Small
b/p
Small
b/p
Big
b/p
Big
b/p
Panel A: Jones (1991)
Opacity 0.006
[0.567]
-0.117
[0.669]
0.020***
[0.000]
0.979*
[0.063]
-0.193
[0.625]
-2.294**
[0.048]
Opacity # IFRS
  
0.131
[0.632]  
-0.961*
[0.068]  
2.651**
[0.030]
Obs. 3677 3677 800 800 993 993
R2 0.3495 0.3659 0.0365 0.0439 0.1015 0.1507
R2_adjusted 0.3481 0.3642 0.0280 0.0330 0.0952 0.1430
Panel A: Teoh et al. (1998)
Opacity 0.008
[0.472]
-0.189
[0.558]
0.024***
[0.001]
0.838
[0.124]
-1.535**
[0.040]
-2.863**
[0.037]
Opacity # IFRS
  
0.205
[0.525]  
-0.816
[0.134]  
1.084
[0.509]
Obs. 3677 3677 800 800 993 993
R2 0.3495 0.3660 0.0368 0.0423 0.1048 0.1532
R2_adjusted 0.3481 0.3643 0.0283 0.0314 0.0984 0.1454
Panel A: Kothari et al. (2005)
Opacity 0.010
[0.221]
-0.279
[0.320]
0.019***
[0.000]
0.805*
[0.078]
-0.146
[0.633]
-2.653**
[0.010]
Opacity # IFRS
 
0.299
[0.285]
-0.787*
[0.085]
3.292***
[0.002]
Obs. 3677 3677 800 800 993 993
R2 0.3495 0.3664 0.0365 0.0425 0.1015 0.1557
R2_adjusted 0.3481 0.3647 0.0279 0.0316 0.0951 0.1480
Panel A: KS Model
Opacity 0.010
[0.194]
-0.216
[0.188]
0.014***
[0.000]
-0.091
[0.786]
-0.362
[0.232]
-1.275**
[0.034]
Opacity # IFRS
 
0.235
[0.152]
0.106
[0.753]
1.827***
[0.007]
Obs. 3677 3677 800 800 993 993
R2 0.3495 0.3663 0.0358 0.0362 0.1026 0.1521
R2_adjusted 0.3481 0.3645 0.0273 0.0252 0.0962 0.1443
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Panel B. France
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Companies
 
All
b/p
All
b/p
Small
b/p
Small
b/p
Big
b/p
Big
b/p
Panel A: Jones (1991)
Opacity -0.022**
[0.043]
-0.020***
[0.004]
-0.013**
[0.011]
-0.014***
[0.000]
-0.447
[0.613]
-0.759
[0.573]
Opacity # IFRS
 
-0.072
[0.141]
-0.024
[0.725]
-0.495
[0.768]
Obs. 2941 2941 739 739 588 588
R2 0.3146 0.3292 0.0330 0.0500 0.2580 0.2763
R2 adjusted 0.3127 0.3269 0.0237 0.0383 0.2490 0.2650
Panel A: Teoh et al. (1998)
Opacity -0.022**
[0.046]
-0.021***
[0.008]
-0.013***
[0.005]
-0.013***
[0.000]
-0.834
[0.443]
-1.395
[0.238]
Opacity # IFRS
 
-0.091
[0.176]
-0.066
[0.392]
-2.043
[0.503]
Obs. 2957 2957 739 739 589 589
R2 0.3154 0.3300 0.0330 0.0506 0.2595 0.2786
R2_adjusted 0.3136 0.3277 0.0237 0.0389 0.2505 0.2674
Panel A: Kothari et al. (2005)
Opacity -0.022**
[0.042]
-0.021***
[0.005]
-0.014**
[0.012]
-0.014***
[0.000]
-0.352
[0.609]
-1.277
[0.324]
Opacity # IFRS
 
-0.066
[0.168]
-0.050
[0.429]
0.740
[0.600]
Obs. 2941 2941 739 739 588 588
R2 0.3146 0.3292 0.0332 0.0507 0.2580 0.2767
R2_adjusted 0.3127 0.3269 0.0239 0.0390 0.2490 0.2654
Panel A: KS Model
Opacity -0.156***
[0.001]
-0.110*
[0.064]
-0.069
[0.273]
0.048
[0.500]
-0.231
[0.148]
-0.260
[0.665]
Opacity # IFRS
 
-0.106
[0.174]
-0.261**
[0.012]
0.037
[0.952]
Obs. 2660 2660 604 604 586 586
R2 0.3381 0.3527 0.0395 0.0679 0.2904 0.3061
R2_adjusted 0.3361 0.3503 0.0282 0.0538 0.2818 0.2953
The standard errors of  the regressions were estimated in a robust manner. The p-values
are shown in brackets.***, **, * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.5 and 0.10.The betas and
significance values of  the control variables are omitted due to space restrictions; they
are available upon request for interested readers.
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Appendix D. Evolution of  R2
The graphs show the evolution of  the R2 of  the regression for the stock returns
during the years studied. The solid line is the mean of  the R2, while the dotted line is
the standard deviation. The dashed line is a linear estimate of  the trend of  the mean.
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